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Abstract: In theory, monetary policies that target the price level, as opposed to the in-
°ation rate, should be highly e®ective at stabilizing the economy and avoiding de°ation
in the presence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. With such a policy,
if the short-term interest rate is constrained at zero and the in°ation rate declines below
its trend, the public expects that policy will eventually engineer a period of above-trend
in°ation that restores the price level to its target level. Expectations of future monetary
accommodation stimulate output and in°ation today, mitigating the e®ects of the zero
bound. The e®ectiveness of such a policy strategy depends crucially on the alignment of
the public's and the central bank's expectations of future policy actions. In this paper, we
consider an environment where private agents have imperfect knowledge of the economy
and therefore continuously reestimate the forecasting model that they use to form expec-
tations. We ¯nd that imperfect knowledge on the part of the public, especially regarding
monetary policy, can undermine the e®ectiveness of price-level-targeting strategies that
would work well if the public had complete knowledge. For low in°ation targets, the
zero lower bound can cause a dramatic deterioration in macroeconomic performance with
severe recessions occurring with alarming frequency. However, e®ective communication
of the policy strategy that reduces the public's confusion about the future course of mon-
etary policy signi¯cantly reduces the stabilization costs associated with the zero bound.
Finally, the combination of learning and the zero bound implies the need for a stronger
policy response to movements in the price level than would otherwise be optimal and such
a rule is e®ective at stabilizing both in°ation and output in the presence of learning and
the zero bound even with a low in°ation target.
¤Prepared for the Bank of Korea International Conference 2006, June 15{17, 2006. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily re°ect those of the management of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco or any other person in the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
The successful reduction of in°ation to low levels in many countries raises the question
of how to best design monetary and ¯scal policies to reduce the risk of de°ation and to
facilitate a rapid return to price stability if de°ation occurs. The recent experience of
de°ation and near-zero short-term interest rates in Japan and the brief °irtation with
in°ation and interest rates around one percent in the United States has led to a renewal
of research into the design of monetary policy that takes account of the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates. A recurring ¯nding in this literature is that monetary policy
strategies that explicitly or implicitly target the price level, as opposed to the in°ation
rate, should be highly e®ective at both mitigating the e®ects of the zero lower bound
and at minimizing the duration and depth of de°ationary episodes (see Reifschneider and
Williams 2000, Svensson 2001, Eggertsson and Woodford 2003). In these models, the
promise of future, indeed at times distant future, above-trend in°ation aimed at restoring
the price level to its target level provides a powerful pull on an economy experiencing
de°ation and constrained by the zero lower bound. Indeed, according to this research, a
central bank can successfully target a constant price level with virtually no cost in terms
of macroeconomic stabilization resulting from the zero bound.
These results rely on two crucial assumptions. The ¯rst assumption is that the central
bank can credibly commit to follow such a price-level targeting policy. Eggertsson (2006)
challenges the assumption the central bank can necessarily commit to future high in°ation
following a period of de°ation associated with monetary policy being constrained by the
zero lower bound. If the central bank lacks the ability to commit to future high in°ation,
the upward pull on in°ation and output from the future is diminished as the public rightly
anticipates that the central bank will choose only to bring in°ation back to its target level
and let the fall in the price level be bygones.
The second critical assumption is that private agents properly anticipate the impli-
cations of the monetary policy strategy on the future path of policy and the economy.
Reifschneider and Roberts (2005) show that price-level-targeting monetary policy rules
may lose some of their e®ectiveness in the presence of the zero bound when expectations
are allowed to deviate from rational expectations. In this paper, we examine the role of
1expectations formation on the e®ectiveness of monetary policy strategies in the presence
of the zero bound. We follow the recent literature on learning and consider environments
where agents have imperfect knowledge of the structure of the economy and monetary
policy strategy and regularly update their beliefs about both based on past experience.
We explore the conditions under which imperfect knowledge weakens or even disables the
expectations channel that is essential to many proposed monetary policy strategies in
the face of the zero lower bound. In addition, we examine the implications for monetary
policy design to make it more robust to the presence of both imperfect knowledge and
the zero bound.
Our framework also enables us to analyze the e®ects of communication strategies that
help the public predict the future course of monetary policy. A number of papers that
propose speci¯c policy actions such as pegging the exchange rate, in°uencing larger-term
bond rates, and increasing the monetary base, when the interest rate is already zero high-
light the communication aspect of the such policy actions (see Meltzer (2001), Svensson
(2001), McCallum (2002), Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), and McGough, Rudebusch, and
Williams (2005)). But these papers typically assume that the public is fully informed
about the determination of monetary policy and the behavior of the economy, so the
bene¯ts of central bank communication cannot be analyzed directly. Orphanides and
Williams (2005a) show that improving the public's understanding of the policy rule re-
duces private expectations errors and, in so doing, improves macroeconomic performance.
But, this analysis ignores the zero bound. As we show in this paper, the presence of the
zero bound further complicates the public's learning problem and ampli¯es the costs as-
sociated with expectation errors. Therefore, the bene¯ts of clearly communicating policy
are heightened.
Our analysis reveals three main ¯ndings. First, imperfect knowledge on the part of the
public, especially regarding monetary policy, can undermine the e®ectiveness of monetary
policy strategies that would be highly e®ective if the public had complete knowledge.
For low in°ation targets, the zero lower bound can engender a dramatic deterioration in
macroeconomic performance, with severe recessions occurring relatively frequently. Sec-
ond, e®ective communication of the policy strategy that reduces the public's confusion
about the future course of monetary policy signi¯cantly reduces the stabilization costs
2associated with the zero bound. Third, the combination of learning and the zero bound
implies the need for a stronger policy response to movements in the price level than would
otherwise be optimal. Indeed, such a rule is better at stabilizing both in°ation and out-
put in the presence of learning and the zero bound, and is highly e®ective even if with an
in°ation target of only one percent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model and
monetary policy. Section III describes the formation of expectations. Section IV outlines
the model simulation methodology and describes the calibration of model parameters.
Section reports the results of the monetary policy analysis. Section VI concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes the empirical macroeconomic model used for our analysis. The
model is a so-called hybrid New Keynesian model (see Woodford (2003) for further details
and references regarding similar models). The model contains key features of output
and in°ation dynamics of many recent micro-founded models used for monetary policy
evaluation (Cf. Levin et al (2006)). Each period in the model corresponds to one quarter
of a year.
2.1 Output and In°ation















where Ft¡1 refers to the agents' forecast based on information available at the end of
period t¡1, it is the short-term nominal interest rate, ¼t is the in°ation rate, and r¤
t is the
stochastic natural rate of interest (around a ¯xed long-run value of ¹ r¤), assumed to follow
an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with variance ¾2
r. The lag of the output gap in the equation
captures the e®ects of habit in preferences. Note that because we consider deviations
from rational expectations where agents have imperfect knowledge of the true structure
3of the economy, we replace the standard mathematical expectations with private agents'
forecasts. In addition, as emphasized by Preston (2005), under imperfect knowledge one
cannot make the substitutions that are commonly used in the literature to rewrite this
equation in terms of ¯nite leads of the output gap. Instead, we assume that decisions are
based explicitly on expectations of the fundamental determinants of the output decision.
The equation for in°ation is based on a Calvo pricing model with partial indexation
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where ut is a markup shock, assumed to follow an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with variance
¾2
u. As in the case of the output equation, we assume that pricing decisions are based on
expectations of their fundamentals determinants.
2.2 Monetary Policy
We assume that the central bank's objective is to minimize the weighted sum of the
unconditional variances of the in°ation gap (the di®erence between the in°ation rate and
its target), the output gap, and the short-term nominal interest rate. The central bank
loss, L, is given by:
L = VAR(¼t ¡ ¼
¤) + ¸VAR(yt) + ºVAR(it); (3)
where VAR(x) denotes the unconditional variance of a variable x, ¸ is the relative weight
on output gap variability, and º is the relative weight on nominal interest rate variability.
In the following, we assume that ¸ = 0:5 and º = 0:1. This choice of º assures that
the degree of interest rate variability is similar to the historical experience in the United
States over the past 20 years.
Based on the ¯ndings of the theoretical literature, we assume that monetary policy
follows a reaction function that reacts to the gap between the price level and a determin-
istic trend. We start with the \di®erence rule" speci¯cation of monetary policy similar to
that advocated by Orphanides and Williams (2006), given by:
it = maxfit¡1 + °¼(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼
¤) + °¢y¢yt¡1;0g; (4)
4where ¢ denotes the ¯rst di®erence operator, and the \max" function re°ects the presence
of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.1 We assume that the central bank
responds to data with a one-quarter lag. Note that by integrating this equation (and
assuming the rule is followed without deviation), it is identical to a policy rule where the
level of the interest is determined by the price level gap (the di®erence between the price
level and a deterministic trend), the level of the output gap, and a constant. Orphanides
and Williams (2006) show that rules of this form are robust to uncertainty regarding
the model of agents' expectations, be it rational expectations or learning. However, that
analysis abstract from the zero lower bound on interest rates.
As noted by Reifschneider and Williams (2000), the zero lower bound poses a problem
for di®erence rules in that past deviations owing to the zero bound are carried forward into
an excessively high current interest rate mechanically through the e®ects of the lagged
interest rate. An alternative implementation that is equivalent in the absence of the zero
bound but avoids this problem with the zero bound is for monetary policy to follow the
integrated version of the rule:
it = maxf°¼(pt¡1 ¡ p
¤
t¡1) + °¢yyt¡1 +¹ i
¤;0g; (5)
where pt is the log of the price level, p¤
t is the target price level that follows p¤
t = p¤
t¡1+¼¤,
and the ¯nal term:
¹ i
¤ = ¼
¤ + ¹ r
¤
is the long-run neutral nominal interest rate.
2.3 Fiscal Policy
Eggertsson and Woodford (2005) show that ¯scal policy can be used to complement
monetary policy when the zero bound is a constraint on policy. In order to explore the
ability of monetary policy alone to cope with the zero bound, we do not consider the
use of government spending or distortionary taxes as a complement to monetary policy.
Instead, we assume that in general the ¯scal authority is entirely passive. Given this
1We could impose a slightly positive lower bound of iLB. In terms of our analysis, this corresponds
exactly to an in°ation target for ¼¤ ¡ iLB. The experience of Japan over the past decade suggests that
the lower bound is very near zero.
5assumption, in periods of severe de°ation, the economy can get stuck in a de°ationary
trap. In such cases, we assume that ¯scal policy will take steps that limit the duration
of such an episode to ¯ve years, at which time the economy is brought back to steady
state. From then on, ¯scal policy reverts to a passive role. As discussed below, this
\backstop" ¯scal intervention occurs very rarely when monetary policy is doing a good
job of stabilizing the economy on average, and therefore is best viewed as a means of
keeping the computation of model moments from being dominated by extreme outliers.
Regular occurrences, on the other hand, indicate that the stipulated monetary policy rule
does not stabilize the system e®ectively.
3 Expectations Formation
We assume that agents form expectations using a reduced-form forecasting model of
the economy as opposed to using the full structural model as would be the case under
model-consistent (i.e., rational) expectations. We specify the forecasting model such that
it exactly corresponds to the reduced-form of the the structural model under the joint
assumptions of rational expectations and the absence of the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates. We assume that agents continuously re-estimate the forecasting model
based on past observations using a constant-gain least squares algorithm (see Sargent
(1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a fuller discussion of constant gain learning).
Given the structure of the model and the stipulated form of the monetary policy rule,
under rational expectations and ignoring the zero bound, ¯ve variables { the in°ation
rate, the output gap and its ¯rst lag, the interest rate, and an intercept { fully describe
the state of the economy at the end of a period. We assume that agents compute forecasts
using a linear forecasting model with these ¯ve explanatory variables. At the end of each
period, agents re-estimate this forecasting model using the currently available data and
use the resulting model to construct forecasts. We also consider alternative assumptions
regarding how agents forecast interest rates within the context of their forecasting model.
Let Yt denote the 1 £ 3 vector consisting of the period t values of the variables to be
forecast: Yt = (¼t;yt;it). Let Xt denote the the 1£5 vector consisting of the explanatory
variables: Xt = (¼t¡1;yt¡1;it¡1;yt¡2;1). Estimation is be described as follows: Let ct be
6the j £5 vector of coe±cients of the forecasting model. Then, using data through period
t, the parameters for the constant-gain least squares forecasting model can be written as:
ct = ct¡1 + ¹R
¡1
t Xt(Xt ¡ X0
tct¡1); (6)
Rt = Rt¡1 + ¹(XtX0
t ¡ Rt¡1); (7)
where ¹ > 0 is the gain.
In the case of forecasts of the interest rate, we deviate from this simple forecasting
method. First, we impose the zero lower bound on forecasts of all future nominal interest
rates. Speci¯cally, in period t we compute the forecast for t+1 variables. If the forecasted
value of the interest rate in period t + 1 is negative, we set that value to zero. We then
compute the t + 2 forecast of all variables and follow the same procedure, and so on. In
this way, we enforce the zero bound both on the actual value of the interest rate and
on expectations of future interest rates.2 In principle, agents need forecasts for in¯nitely
many periods in the future. However, to keep the problem tractable, we approximate this
in¯nite sum with a truncated sum of k periods, replacing the terms for periods k +1 and

















Given the dynamics of the system, we ¯nd that k = 20 is su±cient to get accurate
solutions and use that value for all results reported here. The results with k = 40 are
generally very close to those for k = 20.
We consider two alternative ways for agents to form forecasts of the interest rate. The
¯rst approach is simply to use the model as described above. Absent the zero bound,
the interest rate equation in the forecast model is identical to that describing policy, so
the ¯t of the forecasting equation is perfect. The presence of the zero bound, however,
2Note that this method implicitly imposes certainty equivalence by ignoring the distribution of interest
rate forecasts and its e®ect on the expected interest rate from the zero bound. Incorporating this channel
requires the use of computationally intensive nonlinear methods and is beyond the scope of this paper.
7introduces positive deviations from the simple linear policy rule. The basic forecasting
model implicitly treats these deviations as part of the interest rate process, and these
deviations a®ect the forecast of future interest rates directly, through the lagged interest
rate in the model, and indirectly, through the e®ect on estimated parameters of the interest
rate equation in the forecasting model.
The second approach to modeling agents' interest rate forecasts is for agents to use
the actual policy rule in forming forecasts, conditional on the forecasts of in°ation and
the output gap. This is accomplished by substituting the policy rule for the interest rate
equation in the forecasting model. In particular, if the nominal interest rate depends
on the lagged price level and output gap, then agents will not be fooled by deviations
from the rules and will forecast monetary policy to eventually restore the price level to
its target.
4 Model Solution and Calibration
This section describes the method used to compute model statistics and the calibration
of the model parameters. Owing to the presence of the zero lower bound and learning, we
cannot apply standard methods of solving and computing unconditional moments of linear
rational expectations models. Instead, we use simulated moments as approximations of
the unconditional moments.
4.1 Model Simulation Methodology
For a given parameterization of the model, the simulated model moments are computed
based on a single stochastic simulation consisting of 101,000 periods, where the ¯rst 1000
observations are dropped in order to remove the e®ects of initial conditions.3 The initial
conditions for all model variables and the forecasting model matrices c and R are given
by the corresponding steady-state values of the rational expectations equilibrium with
3Based on simulations under rational expectations in which we can compute the moments directly,
this sample size is su±cient to yield very accurate estimates of the unconditional variances. In addition,
testing indicates that 1000 periods is su±cient to remove the e®ects of initial conditions on simulated
second moments.
8no zero bound. The shocks are generated using MATLAB's Gaussian pseudo-random
number generator \randn."
The presence of either the zero bound or learning introduces a nonlinearity into the
model that can generate explosive behavior in a simulation of 100,000 periods, even for
policy rules that are stable under rational expectations. One potential source of instability
under learning is the possibility that the forecasting model itself may become unstable.
To mitigate the possibility that instability in the forecasting model generates explosive
behavior in the model economy, we do the following. During each period of the simulation,
we compute the root of maximum modulus of the forecasting VAR excluding the constants.
If the modulus of this root falls below the critical value of 1.1, the coe±cients of the forecast
model is updated as described above; if not, we assume that the forecast model is not
updated and the matrices ct and Rt are held at their respective previous period values.
This cuto® is invoked only extremely rarely in the simulations.
However, stability of the forecasting model is not su±cient to assure stability of the
full model in all situations. For this reason, we impose a second condition that restrains
explosive behavior. In particular, if the absolute values of the in°ation gap, output gap,
or interest rate gap (the nominal interest rate less the long-run neutral rate), exceed very
large values, then the o®ending variables are simply set to the relevant boundary value.
We use a bound of 20 percentage points for the interest rate and the output gap and 10
percentage points for the in°ation rate. The upper bounds are included for symmetry.
Of course, this lower bound on the nominal interest rate is irrelevant given the zero lower
bound that is part of the determination of the interest rate. These bounds are set wide
enough that they only bind very rarely or never when policy is e®ective at stabilizing the
economy, but bind more frequently when policy is ine®ective, as discussed below.
4.2 Model Calibration
In the model simulations we consider a range of values of the constant-gain learning
parameter, ¹. One extreme assumption that we consider is where the public does not
change their estimates at all, but rather uses the parameters associated with the rational
expectations equilibrium ignoring the zero bound. Given the presence of the zero bound,
9the case of ¹ = 0 is not the same as rational expectations, but is closely related in that
the parameters of the forecasting model are constant. As such, it provides a benchmark
that replicates key features of outcomes under full model-consistent expectations.
For the case of learning, we take 0.02 as our benchmark value of ¹, and consider
alternative values of 0.01 and 0.03 as a robustness exercise. A number of researchers
have estimated the value of ¹ within a learning framework using postwar U.S. data (see
Sheridan (2003), Milani (2005, 2006), Orphanides and Williams (2005b), Branch and
Evans (2005)). Although the estimates di®er across speci¯cations and samples, and are
in some cases quite imprecise, the central tendency of these estimates is between 0.02
and 0.03. The value of 0.02 implies that the data from the past 10 years accounts for
a little more than 1/2 of the weight in the estimation, data from the preceding 10 years
accounting for 1/4 of the weight, and data more than 20 years old accounting for the
remaining 20 percent. The average age of the data used in estimation is about 12.5 years,
the same as would be the case if agents used standard least squares regressions with 25
years of data. This seems a plausible value given the data limitations that people face in
the real world.
We cailibrate the model parameters describing the output gap and in°ation dynamics
using Milani's (2006) estimates of a very similar model under learning.4 The upper part
of Table 1 reports these parameter values. Note that they are ¯xed across the di®erent
speci¯cations of the learning rate.
The calibration of the long-run neutral real interest rate is important in terms of
interpreting our results with respect to the optimal choice of an in°ation target. The
neutral long-run nominal interest rate, ¹ i¤, measures the average \cushion" that the central
bank has to lower rates, starting from the deterministic steady state. The larger the
cushion, that is, the larger is ¹ it, the less frequently the zero lower bound constrains
policy and the shorter the periods the constraint is binding. In terms of our analysis,
the decomposition of the long-run neutral nominal interest rate into its real and in°ation
4Milani (2006) estimates a model where the shocks to the natural rate of interest and the markup
follow AR(1) processes. This model is quite similar to the one that we use in this paper, once one applies
the appropriate transformation to eliminate the serial correlation to the shocks. Therefore, Milani's
estimates are reasonable for the model used in this paper. Moreover, the parameter estimates are within
the range of other estimates of similar models in the literature.
10components is irrelevant. However, to aid in the interpretation of our results, it is useful
to discuss results in terms of the in°ation target as opposed to the neutral nominal rate.
For this purpose, we assume that the long-run real neutral rate is 2.5 percent, about its
long-run average in the postwar U.S. economy.5 Thus, in the following, results for the case
of an in°ation target of x percent refer to an economy with a neutral long-run nominal
interest rate of x + 2:5 percent.
The innovation variances are crucial for conducting analysis with the zero bound on
interest rates. All else equal, the larger the variances, the more often the zero bound
constrains policy and the larger are the e®ects of the zero bound. We therefore took
pains to calibrate these variances in a manner consistent with the empirical evidence on
the U.S. economy over the past 20 years. First, we computed the variances of the GDP
price index in°ation rate and the federal funds rate over the sample of 1985-2005. We
then chose the innovation variances so that the model-generated unconditional variances
assuming rational expectations and no zero bound were close to their respective empirical
counterparts for the federal funds rate and the in°ation rate. (We assume no covariance
in the innovations.) This method yielded the values of the calibrated standard deviations
of the innovations are reported in ¯rst column of the lower part of the table.
As noted by Orphanides and Williams (2005a), the presence of learning tends to raise
the magnitude of °uctuations in a model economy relative to that that occurs under ra-
tional expectations. This is also true for the model analyzed in this paper. Therefore, in
order to make the models with the di®erent values of ¹ comparable in terms of baseline
unconditional moments before introducing the zero bound, we calibrated the innovation
variances separately for each value of ¹, so that the model-generated unconditional vari-
ances of in°ation, the output gap, and the short-term interest rate were about the same
in all variants of the model.6 The innovation variances decline slightly as the value of ¹
rises.
5This calculation is based on using the personal consumption de°ator as the price measure. This is
the same value for ¹ r¤ used by Reifschneider and Williams (2000). For alternative assumptions regarding
this value of ¹ r¤, one can translate the results in the following section by modifying the assumed values of
¼¤ so that the underlying values of ¹ i¤ is the same.
6For this calibration exercise, we use a benchmark policy rule of °1 = 1;°2 = 0:25, and °3 = 1.
115 Monetary Policy Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the performance of monetary policy rules in in environments
where the zero lower bound is occasionally binding under alternative assumptions regard-
ing the formation of expectations.
5.1 Benchmark Monetary Policy Rule
We start by constructing a benchmark monetary policy rule. For this purpose, we use
the methods described in Levin et al (1999) to compute the coe±cient values for °2 and
°3 in the monetary policy rule that minimizes the central bank loss assuming rational
expectations and abstracting from the zero lower bound. The resulting coe±cient values
are given by: °2 = 0:1 and °3 = 1. Orphanides and Williams (2005a, 2006) show that
optimal policy under learning responds more strongly to in°ation than under rational
expectations, so we also consider a more aggressive variant of the rule with °2 = 0:25. We
consider two versions of the policy rule, the \di®erence rule" given by equation (4) and
the explicit price-level targeting rule given by equation (5). As noted above, these rules
are identical in the absence of the zero bound but di®er in an economy where the zero
bound is occasionally binding.
5.2 The E®ects of the Zero Bound without Learning
We ¯rst consider the case where the public does not reestimate their forecasting model,
that is, ¹ = 0. We assume that the parameters of the forecast model are those implied
under rational expectations and the absence of the zero lower bound. This might be a
reasonable assumption if the zero bound had not been a constraint on policy in the past.
As expected, the \di®erence" speci¯cation of the policy rule fares very poorly with low
in°ation targets. The upper part of Table 2 shows the results under the di®erence rule.
For these experiments, we assume that the public uses the benchmark forecasting model.
For in°ation targets of 1.5 percent and above, the zero bound has little e®ect and the
economy never experiences severe recessions, as indicated by the percent of the time that
the output gap is below -20 percent. But, for in°ation targets of 1 percent and lower, the
12zero bound causes a signi¯cant deterioration in macroeconomic performance as measured
by the simulated root mean squared values of the in°ation rate and the output gap. For
an in°ation target of zero, this policy rule no longer e®ectively stabilizes the economy and
severe recessions are a regular occurrence.
The problem with the di®erence rule as speci¯ed in equation (4) is that it implicitly
allows upward drift in the price level target when the zero bound is constraining policy,
or is expected to constrain policy in the future. Thus, by including the lagged interest
rate in the rule, this policy undermines the price-level targeting feature that is crucial for
success in the face of the zero bound. For this reason, for the remainder of the paper, we
focus on rules that explicitly target the price level, of the form of equation (5).
The middle panel of the table shows the results for the explicit price-level-targeting
policy rule, where the public uses the benchmark forecasting model. This policy does
a better job than the di®erence rule with low in°ation targets. For in°ation targets of
1 percent and above, the zero bound has little e®ect on macroeconomic performance.
However, for in°ation targets below 1 percent, the zero bound causes a marked rise in the
average magnitude of °uctuations.
This deterioration in performance occurs because agents do not understand that the
central bank will eventually bring the price level back to its target value. Instead, they
implicitly assume that following periods when the zero bound is constraining policy, the
central bank will let bygones be bygones and will act to stabilize the in°ation rate, ir-
respective of the realized price level. For example, assume that the current interest rate
is zero and policy is constrained. Agents forecast the future path of interest rates con-
ditional on the current level of interest rates. As a result, interest rate forecasts will be
higher than the monetary policy rule, which accounts for the price level, implies. As a
result, the expectations channel that is so powerful and helpful when the public under-
stands the central bank is intent on restoring the price level to its target is reduced and
macroeconomic stabilization su®ers.
If the public understands that the central bank is targeting the price level and incorpo-
rates this information in their forecasting model, then the zero bound has no discernable
e®ects on macroeconomic performance even with an in°ation target of zero percent. The
13lower part of Table 2 reports the results. Although our framework does not encompass
fully model-consistent expectations, these results where the public knows the policy rule
mimic those in the literature where the zero bound is not a problem under price level
targeting (see, for example Reifschneider and Williams (2000) for comparison).
5.3 The E®ects of the Zero Bound with Learning
The presence of learning exacerbates the e®ects of the zero bound on the economy. The
upper part of Table 3 reports the simulation results assuming policy follows the explicit
price level targeting rule but the public uses the benchmark forecasting model with ¹ =
0:02. The losses associated with the zero bound are much larger than in the case of no
learning. Indeed, under these conditions, this policy rule does not e®ectively stabilize
the economy for in°ation targets below 2 percent. The zero bound introduces persistent
deviations from agents' forecasting model, just as the case of no learning discussed above.
But, with learning, there is a second channel by which the zero bound a®ects expectations.
During a prolonged episode in which the zero bound is constraining policy, the behavior
of monetary policy and the economy systematically deviates from that implied by the
forecasting model. These deviations set in motion movements in the estimated parameters
of the forecasting model.
Removing public uncertainty about monetary policy signi¯cantly reduces the costs
associated with the zero bound under learning. The lower part of Table 3 reports the
results where the public's forecasts incorporate knowledge of the monetary policy rule.
However, even with full public knowledge of the policy rule, the e®ects of the zero bound
interact with the learning involved with the other equations of the model. As a result,
in°ation targets below 1 percent carry signi¯cant costs in terms of stabilization. Therefore,
in the face of imperfect knowledge and the zero bound, more than communication of policy
intentions is needed. The parameters of the policy rule need to be modi¯ed as well, as we
show next.
145.4 More Aggressive Monetary Policy
A more aggressive policy rule response to in°ation is more e®ective at minimizing the
deleterious e®ects of the zero lower bound. Table 4 shows the results for the economy
with learning where policy follows the more aggressive version of the rule with °2 = 0:25.
The more aggressive rule is e®ective because it reduces the likelihood of de°ation and
therefore entering a liquidity trap and it promises prompt and aggressive action once the
zero bound is no longer constraining policy.
Assuming the public understands the rule, there is little cost to zero in°ation under
this rule. Comparing these results to those in the previous table, this rule delivers better
stabilization of both in°ation and output at a zero percent in°ation target than does the
baseline rule with a 1 percent in°ation target. Figures 1 and 2 show the distributions
of the in°ation rate and the output gap, respectively, under the benchmark and more
aggressive rules when the in°ation target is zero. For these ¯gures, we have assumed
that the public forms expectations using the true monetary policy rule. For the in°ation
rate, we summed the observations below 5 percent into the leftmost bar (and the same
for in°ation rates above 5 percent). For the output gap, we summed the observations
that are greater than 10 percent in absolute value. Absent learning, given the stipulated
objective function, this rule stabilizes in°ation too much at the cost of more variability in
the output gap. However, with learning, its better containment of in°ation helps anchor
in°ation expectations and avoids de°ation and the associated severe recessions.
5.5 Robustness to Alternative Learning Rates
The qualitative results are the same for other values of the learning rate, ¹, but qualita-
tively the losses with low in°ation are much larger when the learning rate is 0.03. Tables
5 and 6 show the results for the economy with alternative learning speeds of ¹ = 0:01
and ¹ = 0:03, respectively, where policy follows the more aggressive version of the rule
with °2 = 0:25. For the case of ¹ = 0:03, if the public knows the policy rule, the costs
associated with the zero bound rise for in°ation targets below 1 percent.
156 Conclusion
The historical experiences of de°ation with interest rates constrained at zero in the United
States in the 1930s and more recently in Japan suggest that it may be prudent to avoid
such situations. One solution is to target an in°ation rate a few percentage points above
zero. Indeed, for this reason and others, in°ation-targeting central banks tend to target an
in°ation rate around 2 percent. Theoretical research on monetary policy yields a far more
optimistic view on the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy even with an
in°ation target of zero. This paper suggests a note of caution regarding the e®ectiveness
of monetary policy in the presence of the zero bound if one abandons the assumption
that the public has perfect knowledge of the economy and the monetary policy strategy.
In a world with imperfect knowledge, policies that would work well if expectations were
rational can perform very poorly if the public has imperfect knowledge, especially when
the public is uncertain of the policy strategy itself. Although not studied in this paper, a
clear corollary of the potential di±culty in stabilizing the economy in the presence of the
zero bound is the potential use of ¯scal policy interventions when policy is constrained at
zero, and the need for more research in this area.
The message of the paper is not, however, entirely negative. First, we show that ef-
fective communication of the monetary policy strategy can reduce the costs associated
with the zero bound. In this respect, our results relate to Eggertsson's (2005) analysis of
the e®ectiveness of the sudden regime shifts in monetary and ¯scal policies in 1933 in the
United States. Second, we ¯nd that a robust strategy to cope with both imperfect knowl-
edge and the zero bound is to respond more strongly to in°ation than would be optimal
under rational expectations. This policy rule, assuming it is communicated e®ectively to
the public, is highly e®ective at stabilizing in°ation and output even with an in°ation
target of one percent.
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¹ 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030
¾r 7.500 7.500 7.250 6.750
¾u 0.550 0.539 0.528 0.507
Notes: Parameter values reported in the upper part of the table are taken from Milani (2006),
Table 3.3. The calibration of the values of the long-run neutral real interest rate, ¹ r¤, and the
innovation standard deviations is described in the text.
19Table 2. The E®ects of the Zero Bound without Learning (¹ = 0)
Baseline Policy Rule: °1 = 1, °2 = 0:1, °3 = 1.
In°ation Root Mean Square Central Frequency
Target (¼¤) In°ation Output Gap Interest Rate Bank Loss it = 0 yt · ¡20
Policy follows di®erence rule (eq. 4), and public forecasts with same
0.0 3.7 7.5 1.8 28.0 22.8 12.0
0.5 2.2 4.5 1.8 10.1 10.2 3.4
1.0 1.2 2.6 1.8 3.4 3.7 0.4
1.5 0.9 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.5 0.0
2.0 0.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 0.7 0.0
3.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.1 0.0
4.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.0 0.0
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), but public forecasts with di®erence rule
0.0 1.5 3.1 1.7 4.9 12.3 1.3
0.5 1.0 2.2 1.8 2.5 6.4 0.2
1.0 0.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 3.2 0.0
1.5 0.9 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.6 0.0
2.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.7 0.0
3.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.1 0.0
4.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.0 0.0
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), and public forecasts with same
0.0 0.9 1.9 1.7 2.0 8.2 0.0
0.5 0.9 1.9 1.7 2.0 4.9 0.0
1.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.7 0.0
1.5 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.4 0.0
2.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.7 0.0
3.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.1 0.0
4.0 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.0 0.0
20Table 3. The E®ects of the Zero Bound with Learning (¹ = 0:02)
Baseline Policy Rule: °1 = 1, °2 = 0:1, °3 = 1.
In°ation Root Mean Square Central Frequency
Target (¼¤) In°ation Output Gap Interest Rate Bank Loss it = 0 yt · ¡20
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), but public forecasts with di®erence rule
0.0 6.7 13.3 3.3 89.8 50.7 40.6
0.5 4.7 9.4 2.9 45.3 27.1 19.5
1.0 3.3 6.6 2.6 22.8 13.4 9.2
1.5 2.5 5.1 2.3 13.4 7.1 5.0
2.0 2.0 4.0 2.2 8.6 3.8 2.8
3.0 1.4 2.9 2.0 4.3 1.2 0.9
4.0 1.0 2.3 1.9 2.7 0.3 0.2
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), and public forecasts with same
0.0 1.7 3.8 1.9 6.8 12.3 2.1
0.5 1.5 3.3 2.0 5.2 7.3 1.3
1.0 1.2 2.8 1.9 3.9 4.2 0.8
1.5 1.1 2.5 1.9 3.0 2.2 0.3
2.0 1.0 2.3 1.9 2.8 1.3 0.3
3.0 1.0 2.1 1.9 2.3 0.3 0.1
4.0 0.9 2.1 1.9 2.3 0.2 0.0
21Table 4. The E®ects of the Zero Bound with Learning (¹ = 0:02)
More Aggressive Policy Rule: °1 = 1, °2 = 0:25, °3 = 1.
In°ation Root Mean Square Central Frequency
Target (¼¤) In°ation Output Gap Interest Rate Bank Loss it = 0 yt · ¡20
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), but public forecasts with di®erence rule
0.0 2.0 4.4 1.9 9.2 15.9 3.0
0.5 1.5 3.4 1.9 5.3 8.4 1.3
1.0 1.2 2.8 1.9 3.7 4.5 0.6
1.5 1.0 2.5 1.9 2.9 2.3 0.3
2.0 0.9 2.3 1.9 2.4 1.0 0.1
3.0 0.9 2.2 1.9 2.3 0.2 0.0
4.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.3 0.1 0.0
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), and public forecasts with same
0.0 0.9 2.7 1.8 3.0 10.8 0.2
0.5 0.9 2.5 1.9 2.6 6.2 0.1
1.0 0.8 2.3 1.9 2.4 3.4 0.0
1.5 0.8 2.3 1.9 2.4 1.8 0.0
2.0 0.8 2.3 1.9 2.4 0.9 0.0
3.0 0.8 2.3 1.9 2.4 0.3 0.0
4.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.3 0.1 0.0
22Table 5. The E®ects of the Zero Bound with Slower Learning (¹ = 0:01)
More Aggressive Policy Rule: °1 = 1, °2 = 0:25, °3 = 1.
In°ation Root Mean Square Central Frequency
Target (¼¤) In°ation Output Gap Interest Rate Bank Loss it = 0 yt · ¡20
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), but public forecasts with di®erence rule
0.0 1.2 2.9 1.8 3.9 13.0 0.6
0.5 1.0 2.6 1.8 3.1 7.2 0.3
1.0 0.9 2.3 1.8 2.4 3.7 0.0
1.5 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.3 1.9 0.0
2.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.2 0.9 0.0
3.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.2 0.2 0.0
4.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.2 0.0 0.0
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), and public forecasts with same
0.0 0.8 2.3 1.7 2.3 10.2 0.0
0.5 0.8 2.2 1.8 2.2 6.0 0.0
1.0 0.8 2.2 1.8 2.2 3.2 0.0
1.5 0.8 2.2 1.8 2.2 1.7 0.0
2.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.2 0.9 0.0
3.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.2 0.2 0.0
4.0 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.2 0.0 0.0
23Table 6. The E®ects of the Zero Bound with Faster Learning (¹ = 0:03)
More Aggressive Policy Rule: °1 = 1, °2 = 0:25, °3 = 1.
In°ation Root Mean Square Central Frequency
Target (¼¤) In°ation Output Gap Interest Rate Bank Loss it = 0 yt · ¡20
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), but public forecasts with di®erence rule
0.0 3.8 8.1 2.5 31.3 24.7 13.6
0.5 2.4 5.3 2.2 13.1 11.4 5.0
1.0 1.7 3.9 2.0 7.0 5.5 2.2
1.5 1.4 3.3 1.9 5.1 3.1 1.3
2.0 1.2 2.9 1.9 4.0 1.7 0.8
3.0 1.0 2.6 1.9 3.1 0.7 0.4
4.0 0.9 2.4 1.9 2.6 0.3 0.2
Policy follows price level rule (eq. 5), and public forecasts with same
0.0 1.2 3.4 2.0 4.8 11.1 0.9
0.5 1.1 3.0 2.0 3.9 6.5 0.5
1.0 1.0 2.7 1.9 3.2 3.5 0.3
1.5 0.9 2.5 1.9 2.7 1.9 0.1
2.0 0.9 2.5 1.9 2.7 1.1 0.1
3.0 0.9 2.4 1.9 2.5 0.5 0.1
4.0 0.8 2.3 1.9 2.4 0.2 0.0
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25Figure 2: Distributions of the Output Gap with a Zero In°ation Target
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